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VREMARKS BY U.S. AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN MIKE MANSFIELD
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN:

REFLECTIONS

Our country confronts many problems and issues today.
Energy, the coal strike, the Panama Canal Treaties, OPEC
and our dependence on it, the Horn in Africa, the Middle East,
the declining value of the dollar -- to mention only some and
they are all on the desks of the President and Congress.

All

of them are serious, all deserve discussion and, if you so
desire, I will be glad to try and answer some of your questions
on these matters at the conclusions of my remarks.
As to Japan

when I left Washington ten months ago my

former colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
assured me I would be welcome to return at anytime to testify,
and that they would try not to be too hard on me.
I intended to wait until I knew all the answers.

I told them
After ten

months on the job in Tokyo I certainly don't know all the
answers -- although I think I have a better understanding of
the nature of the questions.

But I decided, as long as I was

called back to Washington to meet with President Carter on the
upcoming visit of Prime Minister Fukuda)with Vice President
Mondale on his trip to S.E. Asia next month, and with - Ambassador
Robert Strauss on US-Japan trade matters -- I decided to come home
to Montana as well.

I hope you will be as kind as my Senate

friends promised to be.
The large and growing domestic dimension of our relations
with Japan means that more and more Americans have a stake,
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and take an active interest, in our policy toward that
country.

I wanted to listen to some of those people

in the Congress, in business, in the labor movement, and
in the Administration -- and to talk to them about the way
I see the US-Japan relationship.
I have never subscribed to the definition of an Ambassador
In my

as an honest man sent abroad to lie for his country.

ten months on the job I have tried to report accurately what
I have seen, and to give the Japanese Government -- and
Washington -- straight talk.
to you.

I promise to offer the same

I have also tried to avoid one of the perils of

diplomacy -- what they tell me is called "localitis" -becoming so taken with the country to which one is accredited
that judgment suffers and recommendations are warped.
Japan it is especially hard to avoid that pitfall.

In

That

country, like some others in Asia, exerts a powerful influence
on those who live there.
This has not been an easy year in our relations with
Japan, and undoubtedly we are not out of the woods yet.
we have come far enough to take stock

But

to tally our successes,

to acknowledge mistakes, and perhaps to draw some conclusions
which might serve as useful benchmarks for the future.

~---------

..
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Before I get into what I see as the pluses and minuses
of the past year in

us~Japan

about East Asia as a whole.

relations, I want to talk briefly
My portfolio is Japan, but you

can't talk about Japan -- or any part of Asia-- without
reference to the entire region.

Most of the crucial issues

in Japanese foreign policy are Asian issues, and those issues
form the prism through which Japan views its relationship
with the United States.

1977 was an especially intriguing

year in what for me has always been the most intriguing
area of the world.

In the People's Republic of China we have seen over the
past year an increasing turn toward pragmatism, its leadership
searching for ways to modernize its economy while paying
relatively less heed to ideological purity.

As modernization

progresses, the task of governing effectively so vast a segment
of humanity may well grow more rather than less difficult.

In

pursuing modernization, and a climate of security in which
modernization can succeed, China is likely to turn outward
toward Japan, the United States and Europe

for technology

and trade and, to a degree, for tacit political support.
In my judgment, it clearly behooves us -- Japan, the United
States and Europe -- to be judiciously responsive.

For we all

have a profound interest in a stable, peaceful China, engaged
productively in the international system.

- 4 -

The USSR of course is also a participant in the affairs
of East Asia.

While the

non-communi~t

see it as a somewhat unnatural

nations of the region

phenom~non,

a Soviet

presence~

military and political, is increasingly a fact of life.
Our own attitude toward that presence has been realistic
we are concerned by Soviet activities and keep a careful
watching brief, but we are not alarmed.

East Asian nations

themselves -- the PRC of course included

are sufficiently

wary of Soviet intentions that an effective limit is placed on
the growth of Moscow's influence and disruptive potential in
the region.
bili~y

But at the same time we have the vital responsi-

to maintain a strong and credible military force in

East Asia -- one fully capable of sustaining the strategic
equilibrium which has existed there in recent years, and without which there could be great danger for the region and for
the United States.

The major testing ground of that equilibrium, now as
always over the past 30 years, is Korea.

The Korean peninsula

remains the one area in East Asia -- and arguably in the world
-- in which the interests of four major powers are so intimately
juxtaposed and in which military conflict could prove so
dangerous.

Japan is of course uniquely sensitive to the

situation in Korea and our policy toward it.
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In Southeast Asia, the member states of ASEAN have made
continued, impressive progress in economic development and
regional cohesion.

At the same time, I believe some Southeast

Asians have been disturbed by what they perceive to be
lessened US involvement in that region.

They and Japan are

establishing a relationship that promises great benefits to
both sides -- but which both hope will be complemented by a
US-ASEAN relationship of equal substance.

Indochina is preoccupied with internal problems and
harsh intraregional rivalries.

Its immediate future is

problematic-- clearly the ·priority of its governments logically should be upon economic development and resolution of
its currently violent internal conflict.

If logic prevails,

as I hope it will, the prospect for a continued peaceful and
eventually cooperative relationship between Indochina and the
rest of Southeast Asia would seem good.

If that does occur,

Japan's carefully evenhanded diplomacy toward Indochina will
have contributed significantly to the outcome.

I would like to add one more observation about an aspect

or East

Asia especially pertinent in this era of declining

energy resources.
acknowledge,

w~ich

It is my personal view -- and one, I should
is not shared by some of our government

experts in this field.

that the world's next, and perhaps

6

last, great oil find will be in East Asian ·waters.
results of exploration have been

encouraging~

The

There are

indications of oil off the northwest coast of Sakhalin, in the
Yellow Sea off the Gulf of ·Pohai, in the South China Sea, and
in the waters of ·Viet-Nam and the Philippines as well as
Indonesia.

There are conflicting claims of sovereignty in

some of these areas, such as the Spratleys and the East China
Sea north of Taiwan, which have inhibited development even
though much of the affected area is under lease.

When those

disputed claims are resolved, and admitting · that in some cases
this may take years, development will proceed

and the

benefits to the entire world will be immense.

If, as I believe is the case, Japan's confidence in its
partnership with the United States is based heavily on its
perception of our role in East Asia as a whole, what the
Japanese have seen over the past year could not have been
entirely reassuring.

The problem, I am convinced, is one of

perception rather than of reality.

I would ·argue, and have so

argued in many conversations in Japan, that there has been no
lessening of the importance this nation attaches to its ties
with Japan and to its role in East Asia generally.

But there

is no doubt that we have at times given an impression of
indirection and inconsistency.

We have muddied the waters.

This was probably an inevitable by-product of a transition in

7 the United States as sharp as any since World War II.

I, of

course, am of the view that that transition was a healthy phenomenon, representing as it did a vitally necessary political
renewal in this country.

But it has had its disquieting

effects in our relations with Asia.

side

In emphasizing change, we

may have placed insufficient stress on the important

~lements

of continuity in our policies.

I believe our task is to reaffirm the major elements of a
well defined and widely understood Asian policy, while making
the adjustments necessary to insure consistency with chang'ing
circumstances.

Some of these adjustments are highly important,

reflecting the determination of this Administration to construct
a foreign policy fully in accord with American values and which
will elicit the broadest possible popular support.

At the same

time, the basic thrust of our policy toward the region is and
should remain unchanged -- we see ourselves, correctly, as a
major participant in the affairs of East Asia.

Japan is

engaged in something more fundamental -- tailoring its foreign
policy to its position as a major world power, defining its
role vis-a-vis its principal communist neighbors, Southeast
Asia, Europe, and the rest of the world.

In so d6ing, · Japan

continues to see its ties with the United States as the essential foundation upon which to build the structure of its
worldwide diplomacy.

-
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Japan's prospects for continued ·success, in an uncertain
world, are good.
limitless.

The industry and talents of its people are

But Japan faces serious problems as well,

particularly in the economic area.

Americans, and Japan's

other trading partners, sometimes tend to overestimate -its
strengths.

We look at huge trade surpluses, astounding

productivity, high growth rates, low levels of unemployment
and we feel a mixture of awe, envy, frustration and hostility.
For their part, the

~apanese

tend to focus ·too ·sharply on

their weaknesses. · Despite their phenomenal ·economic success
of the last quarter century and their rank ·as the world's
third largest economy, the Japanese think of themselves as a
small, exceedingly vulnerable society, hostage far ·more than
other advanced nations to forces beyond their control -- oil
embargoes, recession, protectionism.

The Japanese have thus

been slow to recognize that their economic power imposes
responsibilities, that other nations as well as they are
vulnerable, that leadership rather than mere participation
is called for.

Perceptions, ours of Japan and Japan's of us,

are out of phase, and perceptions as much as realities phape
international relationships.
back

ov~r

That much was evident in looking

the past year.

It is impo'r tant to recall that a year ago there were not
one but two new governments managing the US-Japan relationship.

~
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When Vice President Mondale arrived in Tokyo on the last day
of January 1977 he was representing a government one week old
to one that was all of one month old.

While our transition

was a bit more sweeping than theirs, the fact is there was new
leadership in Tokyo as well as in Washington, and each
administration was to some extent an unknown quantity to the
other.

There was no dearth of issues to address -- preemi-

nently Korea, nuclear nonproliferation policy, and economic
questions -- and all were to one degree or another affected by
the newness of the governments dealing with them on both sides
of the ocean.

The Japanese were disturbed when a withdrawal of ground
troops from Korea emerged as a tenet of President Carter's
foreign policy during the campaign, and when the Vice President
reaffirmed it during his visit a week after the inauguration.
The Japanese were bothered by the substance of the decision
questioning whether withdrawal could take place without upsetting stability on the peninsula and endangering regional
security.

They were perhaps even

~ore

concerned by the abrupt

manner in which,in their eyes, the decision appeared to have
been taken.

I happen to believe the decision was correct

a wise and judicious measure which fundamentally is an extension of a policy of careful, gradual withdrawal of ground
combat forces dating back to 1969.
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The Japanese now understand that we ·have in mind a
program of carefully phased withdrawal accompanied by
measures to strengthen our remaining air forces and South
Korean forces, and I believe they understand as well that
this withdrawal does not portend any diminution of our commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea.
was not clear at first.

But all this

Perhaps we had not taken sufficient

pains to make ourselves fully understood; and certainly press
treatment of the issue, in this country and in Japan, was
not always accurate and well reasoned.

In any event, the

perceived abruptness of our action for a time undermined
Japanese confidence in the constancy of American policy toward
the most crucial security issue in Asia.
While the problem with Korean troop withdrawal from the
Japanese perspective was its seeming precipitiousness, the
Tokai Mura issue seemed to Japanese observers to reflect at
the outset a too doctrinaire American approach to an exceedingly
complicated issue.

Japan, as you all know, is second to none

in its abhorrence of nuclear weapons.

But as a nation with

few energy resources, it is also second to none in its desire
to exploit the productive potential of peaceful nuclear power.
It sees nuclear industry as the only realistic means for
Japan to achieve a modicum of energy self- sufficiency.
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Thus, Tokai Mura, Japan's pilot reprocessing plant, had become
something of a symbol in Japan.

When we announced in April, two months before Tokai Mura
was to begin operation, that the United States would forego
reprocessing and would encourage other nations to do the same,
we had in mind a worldwide policy affecting ·all nations equally
and to which all nations of good will could subscribe.
and our European allies, saw it somewhat differently.
Japan in particular it caused serious ·problems.

Japan,
For

Not only would

it have meant the abandonment of Tokai Mura and delays in
Japan's nuclear industry development while alternatives to
reprocessing were pursued, it also threatened perhaps irreparable damage to the national consensus which had been painstakingly
built up in support of a nuclear industry.

·Moreover, it seemed

potentially discriminatory -- while we could only encourage
the Europeans to forego . reprocessing, we could, under the terms
of· our bilateral nuclear agreement, forbid

i~

in the case of

Japan.

But the problem was solved -- and I regard its resolution
as perhaps the single most significant achievement
relations in this past year.

in US-Japan

Ambassador Gerard Smith -- and

the President, who took a personal interest in this issue -deserve immense credit.

Intensive negotiations addressing
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both the political and technical aspects of the issue and
extending from April through September resulted in an agreement
meeting the essential needs of both sides -- Japan's for an
early startup of Tokai Mura, ours for a solution consistent
with a more effective nonproliferation regime.

The agreement

'

reflected true compromise, and undoubtedly strengthened rather
than weakened the prospects for broad international agreem.nt
on an alternative to conventional reprocessing.

The reproces-

sing issue is now being studied and debated in an international
context, where it properly belongs.

More complicated, more intractable, and less susceptible
of tidy solution than Tokai Mura are ·the complex of economic
issues confronted in our relations with Japan over the
past year:
Japan's huge worldwide current account surplus;
Japan's massive surplus in our bilateral trade;
Japan's reputation, much of it deserved, as a
restricted market for imports;
~-

pressures in specific sectors of the American
economy attributed to Japanese competition.

The latter category -- what the economists call sectoral
trade problems-- have seemed relatively more ·manageable.
While extremely complicated, they at least are finite.

- 13 Two such problems were especially prominent during the past
year -- color television imports and steel.
in the

.
sales of

A rapid increase

Japanese color TV sets in · l976 caused deep

concern within the US electronics industry and prompted calls
for government action to redress the situation;

Bob Strauss

took this on as one of the first major problems with which he
contended as the President's Special Trade Representative.
He and the Japanese got together on several occasions, and
through persistence, imagination and abundant good will -- the
latter always being the indispensable ingredient -- an agreement was reached which places reasonable limits

on

the export

to this country of Japanese color TV sets.

The second major sectoral problem was in the steel industry.

Earlier in the year, we reached an agreement which placed

limits on specialty steel imports.

The industry's broader

problems were addressed more recently by the Solomon Committee
recommendations establishing a formula intended to insure fair
pricing in a variety of steel products.

In respect to steel, the Japanese recognized months ago
'

that something needed to be done and indicated they would try
to cooperate in whatever solution we might propose.

They had

a considerable wait while we figured out what to do.

We were

without a steel policy for too long a time.

I am hopeful that

•
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our solution -- the reference price system -- will work and
I commend Under Secretary Solomon for the creativity and
vision of his efforts.

It should be noted, however, that

this system is, of course, only a stopgap measure pending a
more permanent solution in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
I think I also should point out an often overlooked aspect of
the steel problem:

that European producers, as much as Japan's

-- and in recent months more than Japan's -- have also made
life difficult for our industry.

We ought not be quick in

blaming other people for our problems -- but if we are allocating blame at all, we should at least do it evenly.

The larger aspects of these economic problems -- our
limited access to Japan as a market and Japan's hugh global
current account surplus
throughout the year.

have been addressed intermittently

Our dialogue on these issues began with

·------~---·--~------~--------
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the Vice President's visit last January, and continued at a
high level with Prime Minister Fukuda's visit to Washington
in March and the participation of both leaders in the London
Economic Summit in May.

They were a matter of almost daily

contact at the expert level throughout the spring and summer.
By the late summer, when it became apparent that projections
made earlier in the year would not hold up, our efforts -- and
Japan's --were stepped up.

In September we and the

J~panese

began a process of

consultation -- not confrontation -- as intensive and far
reaching as any we have had with Japan; ·or perhaps with any
other country, on any issue.

Those consultations, including

the visit here oi Minister Ushiba in December, concluded with
a visit by Ambassador Strauss to Tokyo in mid-January.

It is

fitting that this round -- and it is only a round, we all
recognize that -- ended with Bob Strauss's visit.

More than

any other individual on our side, it was Bob Strauss who
worked with Minister Ushiba and his colleagues in the Japanese
Government to produce a highly satisfactory outcome.

Looking

.

at it from my point of view, I would say that while we were
not always totally consistent in our approach, we certainly
•

did not lack persistence -- and the

res~lts

were good:

--. Japan (our largest agricultural customer by !ar, with
purchases approaching $4 billion a year) has agreed
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to increase its imports of agricultural products
from the United States, in the face of strong opposition from its own farming industry;
-- Japan has indicated its intention to seek a domestic
economic growth rate in 1978 of 7 percent, and has
taken concrete measures to fulfill that goal1
Japan has allowed a sharp appreciation of the yen,
which should over time be reflected in its trade
balance, even though this has endangered many domestic
businesses;
Japan has reaffirmed its commitment to the MTN, and
in advance has lowered its tariffs on products important to the United States, including cars and computers;
Japan has indicated it will exercise restraint in
its export policies and that it will in a variety of
specific ways seek to open its own market to foreign
products;
-~

Japan has acknowledged that the eventual result of
these measures should be a sharp reduction in its
surplus or even equilibrium in its overall current
account balance.

The ultimate effect of these efforts by Japan will not be
evident for some months.

But what is evident now, and what

American observers of these issues should appreciate, is th~t
the steps Japan has decided to take entail genuine sacrifice,

......__..

___
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painful adjustment in wide sectors of its economy, and
significant political risk.
concessions.

They were not easy or empty

Just as these economic problems impact directly

on local communities and specific interest groups in the
United States, creating strong pressures for favorable solutions
which are reflected in and amplified by the Congress, so it is
in Japan.

Many sectors of the Japanese economy are in trouble;

the Japanese Diet represents and defends the position of constituents who feel themselves threatened by American "demands."
Thus, in the context in which they were taken, these were bold
measures by the Japanese Government.

We, and our European

colleagues, must give Japan full credit. ··

I am optimistic.

I know that the steps we and the Japanese

Government have agreed upon are genuine

~rtd

not merely cosmetic

in nature, and I am convinced they are going to show results.
More important perhaps, I know the determination and the commitment both governments bring to these issues; if solutions
are possible -- and, of course, they are -- we are going to find
them and apply them.

A word of caution is in order, however. · No matter

ho~

effective all of our efforts prove to be, they are not going
to solve the world's economic problems.

Even if all goes as

planned in the us-Japan economic relationship, dysfunction .in

.·
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(

the US and world economies will ·remain.
global and solutions must be global.

The ·problems are

The first major step

toward a permanent global solution must be a restoration of
general business confidence and a successful conclusion this
summer to the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva.

Japan and we are committed to that goal.

Nor can even a successful windup of the MTN insure an end
to our problems.

The single most important source of our trou-

bles is not being addressed in Geneva.
massive oil bill.

I

refer to our own

The United States is the world's greatest

user, greatest waster and greatest importer of oil.

So long

as we spend $45 billion per year ·-- or 30 ·percent of our total
import bill -- buying foreign oil, our economy and the world
..t-....<kl ~ fL..~~ .

economy will be out of kilter.v Only we are to blame and only
we can find a solution.

We need an energy program.

The

President has proposed one; it is time for the Congress to act
on it.

When one considers the problems we have faced

~-

none

of them of our making, even though I have suggested we may have
made one or two of them temporarily worse -- we have
through the past year in relatively good shape.
either are resolved or under control.

-··-----·-

go~ten

Major problems

An atmosphere of trust

..
- 19 and confidence has been restored.
all levels are cordial.

Personal relationships at

Thus, the structure for problem

solving is intact and functioning.

For years, people within

the government have spoken of the impressive capacity of the
US-Japan relationship to manage difficult issues, and have
suggested that this was in fact the truest measure of the
strength of the relationship.

If that is true, I would say

1977 proved that our ties are in .pretty good · shape.

We didn't

get the best of every one of our problems, but at least we
didn't let · those problems get the best of us.

So long as we

emphasize candor and cooperation, steering clear of confrontation, we will be all right in the future as well.

I think the

outlook is good.

I want to leave you with one other thought.

For years I

have contended that Americans ought to look west -- all the
way to the Far East-- that we have never ·made adequate efforts
to understand Asia, and that without understanding Asia we are
bound to make some serious mistakes in Asia. · Our history
unfortunately demonstrates this is so.

h~en

we do pay attention

to the region it often is for the wrong reason, and it often is
superficial.

Our own ethnic and cultural heritage is predom-

inantly European and, important though our ties with other
regions are, we continue to have a European bias when we as a
nation view the world.

This is a perception we must work to
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change.

Asia must loom large in our national consciousness:
Our trade with East Asia reached almost $60 billion
in 1977.
Japan is our largest overseas trading partner; our
two-way trade came to nearly $29 billion last year.
Our direct capital investment in East Asia now exceeds
$15 billion, and it is growing rapidly.
Japan is a vital, democratic society in a world
widely hostile to democratic values; ours is truly
an alliance of ideals.
Our role in East Asia -- political, economic and
strategic -- is an essential element in the maintenance
of peace, stability and progress in that region and
serves American interests no less vital than those
at stake in Europe.

Yet far too few Americans take time to really attempt
to understand Japan or Asia.

So long as this is so, our

perceptions as a nation will be faulty, our judgments askewed.
This and other similar groups across the country have as
their goal increased understanding at all levels between
this country and the nations of Asia.

The results of

those efforts won't show in next year's trade balance,
but they may ultimately result in a more balanced American
appreciation of where our true interests lie.

